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Abstract 
Using Swedish data between 1988 and 2014 we investigate if the real corporate borrowing 
interest rate has a significant effect on corporate investment. We find no proof of a connection 
between the change in investment and the fluctuations in the interest rate. However, our 
results indicate a relationship between present and expected demand and the rate of corporate 
investment. According to these results, the common belief among policy makers that lower 
interest rates increases capital expenditures is incorrect. 
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Introduction  
Corporate investment is the engine of growth, so understanding what makes firms invest is 
both an important and interesting subject. Policy makers and central banks have followed the 
same path for years, assuming that the interest rate has a direct effect on aggregate corporate 
investment. Indeed, in theory the interest rate is one of the most powerful levers to convince 
firms to commit to an investment. In short, the framework used by the Swedish Riksbank 
conventionally postulates that interest rate cuts lead to a higher level of aggregate investment 
as external means to finance capital gets cheaper and easier to obtain (Hopkins, Lindé & 
Söderström, 2009). However, interest rate cuts are often carried out in times when the 
economy is facing or expecting a forthcoming period of low inflation. In this situation 
companies may refrain from investing as new capital will not be needed to meet the low 
demand on the market. Consequently, in this paper we investigate the possibility of aggregate 
corporate investment being driven by demand and expectations rather than by the interest 
rates and the cost of capital.  
 
Supporting the hypothesis, Kothari et. al (2014) find a positive relationship between discount 
rates and aggregate corporate investment, i.e., in times of higher discount rates the level of 
aggregate corporate investment is found higher, contradicting the theoretical framework used 
by the Riksbank. As a potential explanation they present the possibility of interest rates and 
aggregate corporate investment both being driven by expectations of future economic activity. 
In the literature stock prices have great support for being a strong predictor of corporate 
investment. Barro (1990) finds that high values of stock prices are closely correlated with 
high levels of investment which is supported by Blanchard, Rhee and Summers (1993). These 
findings do to some extent support our hypothesis as high stock market values are often 
observed in times with high economic output, coinciding with high interest rates. 
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) on the other hand argues that the access to internal 
capital is important for investment, especially for firms that face financial constraints with 
difficulties to access external capital. The relationship can be seen as a double sided coin. On 
one side, greater demand should logically lead to greater profits which can be used as internal 
funding for investment. On the other side, high demand often coincides with high interest 
rates, effectively leading to reduced accessibility for external capital. The reversed 
relationship can be considered in times of low economic activity. However, Myers & Majluf 
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(1984) argues that due to the pecking order theory, internal financing is considered to have 
significant cost-advantages over external financing and is therefore desirable. 
Von Ungern-Sternberg (1980) argues that in order to increase profits and maintain an 
advantageous position in the market firms may want to reduce price and increase quality. This 
will effectively result in a positive effect on the rate of research and development investments 
made by firms. 
In times when the Riksbank unexpectedly lower the nominal base rate, they may send a 
distress signal to the market, increasing uncertainty and thus lowering investment. If the 
policy uncertainty related to the expansionary monetary policy has a greater negative effect on 
corporate investment than the positive effect the nominal base rate has, then aggregate firm 
investment will decline despite the lower interest rate. Gulen & Ion (2013) find that two thirds 
of the 32% drop in corporate investments during the crisis 2007-2009 in the United States was 
due to policy uncertainty. Given this result, policy uncertainty created by the central bank 
may very well have a bigger negative impact on corporate investment than interest rates 
directly, however the exact relationship is subject for further research. Furthermore, under 
high policy uncertainty firms choose to hold significantly more cash and issue significantly 
less debt, postponing investment further (Gulen & Ion, 2013). 
 
In our study we find no direct effect of the interest rate on aggregate real corporate 
investment. We do however see signs pointing towards a positive relationship between 
aggregate investment and expectations of future demand. There are also certain indications of 
a positive relationship between current demand and aggregate investment. 
 
In this paper we investigate the possibility of aggregate corporate investment being driven by 
demand and expectations, contradicting the theoretical framework used by the Riksbank. The 
first section starts with a review of the neoclassical and Tobin’s Q investment theory which is 
based on an optimization problem of the capital stock to meet current demand. In order to 
understand how policy induced interest rate changes transcends into the economy we will in 
the second section tie these theories to the framework used by the Riksbank. The third section 
presents the model and data used in this paper. In the fourth section we present the results of 
the model followed by an analysis in order to determine what variables affects aggregate 
corporate investment. The paper ends with a conclusion. 
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Theoretical background 
Much of the modern theories regarding investment stem from the classical capital theory work 
of Keynes and Fisher (Kuh, 1963) based on investments being made up until the point where 
the value of the future marginal expected revenue is equal to the opportunity cost of capital 
(Fischer 1930; Keynes 1936). Therefore, as long as the expected revenue from an investment 
is higher than the opportunity cost of capital, investment will be worthwhile and undertaken 
by the firm. 
 
There is a fundamental difference between the Keynesian view and Fisher’s view of 
investments. Keynes argued that there is no optimal stock of capital that firms work towards 
obtaining, and therefore no equilibria to adjust towards. Fisher, did however see investment 
theory as an optimisation progress towards an optimal capital stock (Fischer, 1930). 
Investment theory seen as Keynes formulated it is instead heavily influenced by expectations, 
these being irrational as they depend on the “animal spirits” of agents, making equilibria 
impossible to obtain (Keynes, 1936). 
 
Investment Theory 
Neoclassical investment theory  
An evolution of the work by Fisher is the neoclassical investment theory developed by 
Jorgenson in 1963 that draws its fundamentals from the maximisation of utility and wealth 
over time for a firm (Eklund, 2013). The production function and profit function is optimized 
in order to maximise the discount flow of all future profits (Jorgenson 1963). In the 
neoclassical model adjustment costs are assumed to be absent, moreover it assumes that future 
net worth of investments can be calculated, perfect competition on the market and well-
behaving production functions (Fazzari & Mott, 1986). These assumptions enable decision 
makers to equal the interest rate with the marginal rate of return on an investment. As 
corporations can predict the future, the optimal stock of capital will depend on output, price of 
output and the user cost of capital (Weintraub, 2015), which creates the following commonly 
known relationship; 
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𝐾∗ =  
𝛼(𝑌)
𝐶𝑘
𝜎             (1) 
 
where K* is the desired level of capital stock, Y is the level of output, Ck is the user cost of 
capital, α is a function of capital and labour and other factors, and σ is the elasticity of 
substitution parameter between inputs in the production function (Ashworth & Davis, 2001). 
 
As we can see, the interest rate plays a role in the theory as it affects the user cost of capital 
which has a connection to the optimal stock of capital, as well as output. Accordingly, a lower 
cost of capital or and a higher output would lead to the optimal capital stock increasing, thus 
increasing the demand for investment. 
 
Tobin’s Q Investment Theory  
The neoclassical theory has one major drawback as it does not incorporate expectations in the 
model. James Tobin (1969) works around this problem with the introduction of the “Q-
investment theory”. The aggregate (average) Q in Tobin’s model is defined as; 
 
𝑄 =  
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
           (2) 
 
Market value of firms incorporates future expectations the model is appealing. If the market 
value of firms is greater than the replacement cost of capital firms will choose to invest until 
the value of capital equals the replacement cost, thus optimising capital stock (Tobin, 1969; 
Brainard & Tobin, 1968). Hence, the most simple investment equation can be visualised as 
 
𝐼 = 𝛽𝑄         (3) 
            
where β is a strictly positive parameter. Following the same reasoning as above, if Q > 1 
investment should be undertaken. However, the model implies that if Q < 1, the capital stock 
should actually be reduced. Nevertheless, this may in practice not be plausible as much of 
capital should logically be assumed to be, at least partial, irreversible.  
 
If Tobin’s Q is introduced in firms’ optimisation problem, the firms’ investment decision is 
dependent on the level of marginal Q which is defined as the future marginal returns on 
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investment over the current marginal costs of investment. Following the same reasoning as 
before, if marginal Q > 1, investment should be undertaken by the firm (Abel, 1980; Hayashi, 
1982; Lucas & Prescott, 1971).  
 
Interest Rates as a Mean to Affect Corporate Investment 
Monetary policy and investment theory is closely linked as monetary policy is meant to affect 
determining variables in the investment theories. Monetary policy affects the aggregate 
corporate investment through various “channels” in the monetary transmission mechanism 
framework1 adopted by the Riksbank (Hopkins, Lindé & Söderström). In this section we link 
some of these transmission channels to the investment theory in order to get an understanding 
of what effect monetary policy has on investment.  
 
Interest Rate Channel 
The primary channel in the monetary transmission mechanism is the interest rate channel 
(Kuttner & Mosser, 2002). As the central bank lowers the short term nominal rates, the long 
term nominal rates will decline due to removal of arbitrage possibilities by the market. As 
prices are sticky, the lower nominal interest rate will effectively induce a lower real interest 
rate through the Fisher equation2 (Fisher, 1930). With lower interest rates, firms’ cost of 
capital decreases. If we consider the investment theories in the previous section we see that a 
decrease in cost of capital will induce a higher optimal capital stock in the neoclassical 
investment theory and decrease the replacement cost of capital in Tobin’s Q investment 
theory, thus theoretically leading to a higher rate of investment. Furthermore, when the 
interest rate is lowered consumers face lower interest rate for their savings and consumption 
will increase. This leads to increased domestic demand and output for firms, effectively 
increasing Q and optimal capital stock. (Mishkin F. S., 1996) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 For an overview of these channels see Mishkin (1995) 
2 For more information about real interest rate and its connection to monetary policy see Lagervall (2008) 
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Exchange Rate Channel 
In open economies, real effects of an expansionary policy will affect the economy through the 
exchange rate channel (Kuttner & Mosser, 2002). If the domestic interest rate decreases, the 
domestic exchange rate relative to foreign exchange rates will decrease through the uncovered 
interest rate parity. Domestic companies will therefore experience an increase in foreign 
demand stemming from a greater demand of their relatively cheaper products. A depreciation 
of the currency also leads to greater demand from domestic consumers, as the relative price of 
imported goods increases (Mundell 1963). The effect of the exchange rate channel in case of 
an interest rate cut thus has a positive effect on output in the neoclassical investment theory 
and the market value of firms in Tobin’s Q investment theory.  
  
Credit Channel 
Long-term assets such as bonds and stocks are affected when interest rates fluctuate over 
time. In case of an interest rate decline, the value of such assets will increase due to the 
inverse relationship between interest rates and price of long term assets (Shiller, 2007). In 
presence of adverse selection and moral hazard between lender and borrower, the premium 
that companies need to pay for external finance declines as the companies’ collateral increases 
in value (Bernanke, Gertler, & Gilchrist, 1996). Higher collateral value of firms consequently 
increase the accessibility of external finance to a lower cost. As a result, firms afford to invest 
more, amplifying the effect of interest rate policy decisions (Ashworth & Davis, 2001). This 
is often referred to as the financial accelerator or the broad credit channel (Kuttner & Mosser, 
2002).The accelerator effect is considered having a greater impact on the investment of small 
firms than it has on larger firms (Guariglia, 1999). 
Lastly we will shortly review the narrow credit channel. As the interest rate declines, the 
commercial banks will increase their lending as buying bonds to now lower interest rate is 
less desirable as a source of revenue than before. As banks increase their lending, companies 
will have easier access to capital at a lower price and therefore increase their borrowing to 
finance investments (Hörngren, 1995).  
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Empirical Analysis 
Economic Model and Data 
The econometric model that will be used in this paper to investigate whether or not the 
changes in the interest rate affects corporate investment is a multivariable OLS- regression, 
based on quarterly data between 1988 and 2014. 
 
The model has been specified as follows:    
∆𝐿𝑛(𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠) =  𝛼 + 𝛽1∆𝑙𝑛 𝑦𝑡−1
𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦 + 𝛽2∆ ln 𝑦𝑡−1
𝑆𝑤𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑛 + 𝛽3∆ ln 𝑦𝑡−1
𝑈𝑆𝐴 +
𝛽4 (
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡−1
100
) + 𝛽5∆𝑙𝑛 (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑡−1) + 𝛽6𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝛽7∆ ln(𝑇𝐶𝑊𝑡−1) +
𝛽8∆ ln(𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡−1) + 𝛽9∆ ln (𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡−2) + 𝜀𝑡    
 
Where ∆Ln(Investments) is the percentage change in companies’ realized real investments 
during the period, α is an intercept, ytGermany  is the percentage change in constructed GDP for 
Germany in chained prices. The GDP is constructed as the combined West and East German 
GDP, enabling us to rely on the pre 1990-data. The percentage change in GDP for Sweden 
and the United States are denoted as yt
Sweden and yt
USA respectively. 
 
The Confidence indicator is an index consisting of companies’ present and expected demand 
for their goods and services. It has been divided by 100 to ease the comparability of the 
coefficients in the model.  
 
∆ln(Profits) is the percentage change in profits for Swedish companies, rt is the interest rate 
that companies face (real corporate borrowing rate). ∆ln(TCW) is the percentage change in 
the TCW-index. 
 
Lastly, ∆ln(Investment) is a lagged dependent variable to help us see effects of previous 
periods investments on the current investment ratio. 
 
The GDP-variables are indicators on the current financial situation, an increase in GDP 
should increase the demand for the company’s products, as many industries are sensitive to 
business cycle fluctuations (Berman & Pfleeger, 1997).  
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The confidence indicator is an index published by the Swedish Institute of Economic 
Research, where the data is collected through a survey conducted quarterly among 6000 
Swedish firms’, asking them about their current demand, their stock of goods and their future 
expected demand. The index is standardized with a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 
10 (National institute of economic research, 2015). Logically, the confidence indicator should 
be positively correlated with investments. Expectations of good times to come leads to 
companies investing to cope with increased demand. 
 
TCW (total competitive weights) is an exchange rate index, measuring the Swedish Krona’s 
value against a basket of other currencies. The weights of the currencies in the basket are 
determined by the amount of trade Swedish firms’ has with said country. An increase in the 
value means that the Swedish Krona has depreciated. (Statistics Sweden, 2015). Intuitively it 
should be positively correlated with our investments, as a higher value of TCW is beneficial 
to the export sector.  
 
Profits lead to companies having the option of re-investing their own capital3, it is therefore 
likely that profits should have a positive relationship with investment.  
 
The real interest rate is calculated using the nominal company borrowing rate (Economics, 
2015), adjusted with the companies’ own inflation expectations4.  
 
We will run the model using a one-period lag amongst our variables as realized investments 
today most likely is based on information from previous periods.  
 
We have five major events in our data that could affect the results and therefore we run the 
test with five different time periods, one between 1988 and 2014, one between 1988 and 
2008, one for 1995-2008, one for 1995-2014 and one for 2008-2014. These major economic 
events in chronological order start with the unification of Germany in 1990, as it might be 
significant to the Swedish export-industry. The following is the financial crisis in Sweden 
from 1990 to 1994 and the abolition of the fixed exchange rate and the introduction of the 
inflation target policy in 1992 and 1995 respectively. The last two policy changes has 
                                                          
3 The discussion about whether or not they do, or should do so, is not addressed in this paper, for some further 
reading see (Dobrovolsky, 1945). 
4 Using the Fisher Equation as proposed by Irving Fisher(1930). 
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significant impacts on the effects of monetary policy and how it can be conducted (Sohmen, 
1969). Thirdly the global financial crisis of 2008 and the drastic shifts in the global economy 
it gave rise to. Lastly we have the zero percent nominal interest rate implemented by the 
Swedish Riksbank in 2014. The results of the last of these major events might not be apparent 
yet in our data and therefore we will not draw any conclusions about the zero interest rate and 
its impact on investments.  
All data has been collected using Thomson Reuters Datastream, where the original data 
comes from Statistics Sweden, the Swedish Institute of Economic Research, the Swedish 
Riksbank, Oxford Economics, the German Federal Statistical Office and the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. 
 
Illustrative Data  
 
 
Figure 1; Percentage change of German GDP 
We can see relatively high volatility in the German output growth the following years after 
the unification in 1990. Between 2001 and 2002 the aftermath of the dot-com bubble can be 
observed. Furthermore, the financial crisis is clearly visible in 2008 and 2009. 
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Figure 2: Percentage change of Swedish GDP 
Notable in Swedish output growth is that the financial crisis in combination with the abolition 
of fixed exchange rate in created relatively high volatility in the early 1990’s. Worth pointing 
out is that all the post 1992 and 1995 data most likely are affected by these major monetary 
policy changes, however no long run trend can visually be observed. The financial crisis can 
clearly be identified in 2008.  
 
Figure 3: Percentage change in USA GDP 
Most notable in the United States GDP growth is the financial crisis in 2008 and the low GDP 
growth following the bust of the dot-com bubble in the early 2000’s.  
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Figure 4; Confidence indicator / 100 
Firms demand and expectations decreased the years prior the abolition of the fixed exchange 
rate in 1992. We can observe a decrease as the inflation target was introduced in 1995. If the 
decrease is due to the inflation target, or just normal cyclical fluctuations is subject for further 
research. Nevertheless, we can identify relatively big a drop in confidence during the financial 
crisis in 2008.  
 
Figure 5: Percentage Change in TCW 
The Swedish Krona depreciated in value relative our big export partners when the fixed 
exchange rate was abandoned in 1992 but appreciated when the inflation target was 
introduced in 1995. Furthermore we can identify a depreciation as a result of the financial 
crisis in 2008. 
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Figure 6: Real Corporate Borrowing Rate 
Most notable in the real corporate borrowing rate is the drop witnessed at the same time as the 
abolition of the fixed exchange rate in 1992. Furthermore, we can see an increase leading up 
to the introduction of the inflation target in 1995. Moreover, an increase is identified in 
connection to the financial crisis in 2008.  
 
Figure 7: Percentage Change in Real Aggregate Corporate Investment 
The aggregate real corporate investment increased following the adoption of flexible 
exchange rates in 1992 and decreased just after the bust of the dot-com bubble. The financial 
crisis is present in this data as we can identify a decline in 2008. 
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Analysis of Data 
Test for Stationarity 
In order to test for stationarity in our variables we use the Dickey-Fuller test as proposed by 
Dickey & Fuller (1979). Under the null hypothesis that the variable contains a unit root we get 
the following results;   
 
Variable: ∆GDP 
GER 
∆GDP 
SWE 
∆GDP 
USA 
∆Investment ∆TCW ∆Profit 
T-stat -7.78  -5.08 -7.15 -3.69 -7.71 -12.18 
P-value 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.03** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Table 1:Augumented Dickey-FullerTest, ***, **, * stands for significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. 
We can see that the null hypothesis can be rejected in all our variables, as we choose the 5% 
level of significance. Therefore it is safe to say that the variables are stationary 
The interest rate5 and the confidence indicator are by definition generally considered as 
stationary and therefore it is not necessary to conduct said test on these variables.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 It is debated whether or not the interest rate is by definition stationary, see Norrbin & Smallwood (2011) for 
further reading on the subject. 
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Regression Results  
In the data, several big economic events occurred as discussed in the previous section. The 
model is therefore ran for five different time periods in order to avoid as much bias as 
possible. The regression results are presented in Table 2: 
Time period: (1)1988-2014 (2)1988-2008 (3)1995-2008 (4)1995-2014 (5)2008-2014 
∆ GDP Germany (-1) 0.35 (0.28) -0.27 (0.36) 0.28 (0.59) 0.81* (0.44) 1.13 (0.97) 
∆ GDP Sweden (-1) -0.32 (0.52) -0.61 (0.58) 0.28 (0.73) 0.42 (0.55) -1.86 (1.68) 
∆ GDP USA (-1) 1.87*** (0.57) 1.19** (0.51) 0.17 (0.74) 1.1* (0.58) 1.81 (1.14) 
Confidence Indicator (-1) 0.15*** (0.05) 0.16*** (0.04) 0.21 ***(0.07) 0.19*** (0.07) -0.33 (0.27) 
∆ Profits (-1) -0.01 (0.05) -0.02 (0.05) -0.11 (0.11) -0.08 (0.10) 0.43 (0.42) 
Real Interest Rate (-1) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) -0.07* (0.04) 
∆ TCW (-1) 0.19 (0.13) 0.29 **(0.13) 0.11 (0.15) 0.05 (0.13) 0.18 (0.33) 
∆ Invest (-1) -0.34*** (0.12) -0.34 ***(0.12) -0.73*** (0.16) -0.63*** (0.12) -0.38 (0.24) 
∆ invest (-2) -0.21** (0.09) -0.22** (0.01) -0.39*** (0.15) -0.29** (0.11) 0.03 (0.27) 
Number of observations n = 108 n = 83 n = 55 n = 80 n = 23 
Table 2: Regression results with coefficients and (S.E), *, **, *** stands for 10, 5, 1 % significance respectively. In periods 1 
and 2 the standard errors has been adjusted for heteroskedasticity. In period 3 the standard errors has been adjusted for 
auto correlation, see appendix for further information. 
A review of every time period will follow before we combine the results in order to draw a 
conclusion. 
 
Period 1 (1988-2014) 
The results from this time period indicate that the interest rate is not significant for the 
aggregate level of real corporate investment. Instead we see that GDP for the United States, 
the confidence indicator and investment conducted in quarter t-1 and t-2 are significant.  
 
An increase in American GDP in the previous quarter has a positive effect on the level of 
aggregate real corporate investment. Since the United States is a major export partner of 
Sweden (Statistics Sweden, 2015), it is possible that a GDP growth leads to the United States 
importing more goods and services from their trade partners, one of which is Sweden. The 
Swedish companies will therefore have to invest in order to meet the increased demand6.  
 
                                                          
6 Optimal capital stock has increased. 
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The significance of the confidence indicator points us in the direction of investments 
depending on demand and expectations of demand. The confidence indicator in this test is 
positively correlated with investment. Since the confidence indicator is a measurement of 
present and expected demand, it gives an indication of what firms believe the demand for 
their goods and services will be in the future (National institute of economic research, 2015). 
 
Previous investments are significant and negatively correlated with investments. Logically 
this could be derived from the intuition that if a firm invests in a durable good in period t-1, 
the need for that investment will not occur again in period t. 
 
Period 2 (1988-2008)   
As seen in the illustrative data, the financial crisis is present in all of our variables. In this test 
all data until the financial crisis hit in 2008 will be included in order to nullify potential biased 
results of the financial crisis. Nevertheless, the change from fixed to exchange rate rate and 
the introduction of the inflation target is still present in the data which potentially could 
impact the results.  
 
The results are similar to the ones from the test conducted on period 1 with GDP for the 
United States, the confidence indicator and investments conducted in t-1 and t-2 being 
significant. All the coefficients have the same signs as before, positive for GDP-USA and 
confidence indicator, while it is negative for previous investments. Hence, the results 
indicates that even if we choose to exclude the happenings occurring after the financial crisis 
of 2008, the significance of the demand driven variables is still palpable. 
 
In contrast to the test conducted on period 1, TCW is introduced as significant in this test with 
a positive coefficient, meaning that when the Swedish krona depreciates investments increase. 
Removing the crisis of 2008 and the fluctuations in exchange rate it has spawned might be a 
reason for why TCW is significant in the period (Kohler, 2010). The introduction of the 
exchange rate, and the relationship it has with investments through the exchange rate channel, 
helps further to imply that the interest rate is not the direct deterministic variable for corporate 
investment, but instead that it is driven by demand, in this case export demand. 
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Period 3 (1995-2008) 
The third test excludes the change to flexible exchange rate, the introduction of the inflation 
target as well as the financial crisis. However the data is limited to 55 observations. 
 
In difference to previous tests, GDP for USA is no longer significant. It is only the confidence 
indicator and previous investments that show signs of affecting the current aggregate 
investments. However trusting this test might be misguiding as the number of observations is 
limited and the probability of getting misleading results increases (Babyak, 2004). Therefore 
it is not advisable to fully rely on the results based on this regression alone.  
 
The regression does nevertheless indicate that the rate of investments does not depend on the 
short-term interest rate, but is instead dependent on current and expected demand of firms. 
 
Period 4 (1995-2014)  
The fourth test in this paper excludes the shift to the flexible exchange rate and the inflation 
target, but incorporates the financial crisis of 2008. 
 
Again, GDP growth for USA, the confidence indicator and previous investments are 
significant. Unlike the other tests however, German GDP is significant in this time period. 
The introduction of German GDP with a positive coefficient is important. As earlier 
mentioned, economic growth among the major export partners leads to Swedish firms meeting 
a higher demand for their products (Taylor, 2000). Germany is the largest export partner of 
Sweden (Statistics Sweden, 2015), therefore fluctuations in German output should 
theoretically impact Swedish export. The GDP for the United States and the confidence 
indicator being significant, as well as previous investments follows the same reasoning as 
earlier.  
 
As in the previous tests, there is a strong tendency towards investment being demand and 
expectations driven rather than by interest rates. 
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Period 5 (2009-2014) 
The fifth test is conducted in order to account for the aftermath of the financial crisis and thus 
leaving out all events up until 2009. By shortening the time period substantially the test only 
includes 23 observations, and is potentially subject for bias (Babyak, 2004).  
 
The results from this test differ from the previous four tests as none of the previous significant 
variables are significant. Instead we see that the real corporate borrowing rate is significant, 
indicating that the interest rate may be a deciding factor of aggregate real corporate 
investment as discussed in the theory chapter of this paper. Meanwhile the result is not 
unorthodox it is a contradiction to the previous tests. 
 
Further Notes on the Results  
If we combine the results from all tests conducted we find that, most notably, the real 
corporate borrowing rate is only significant in time period 5. The test shows a tendency 
towards interest rates having an effect on aggregate real corporate investment. However, the 
test does only contain 23 observations and therefore have a high likelihood of bias (Babyak, 
2004), therefore we take this result very lightly.  
 
The reason for the general insignificance of the interest rate may be a problem of 
simultaneity. The Swedish Riksbank generally loosens policy in times of weak output and 
tightens in times of high output. If we consider the neoclassical investment theory we realise 
that if output is high at the same time as we have high interest rates, high user cost of capital, 
the effect on the optimal capital stock in Equation 1 will potentially to some extent be 
nullified. 
 
Strongly contradicting the result of time period 5, all other tests show significant demand and 
expectation variables, thus showing a strong tendency towards aggregate real corporate 
investment being driven by demand and expectations. In a majority of the other tests we find 
GDP among major export partners, the confidence indicator and previous investments being 
significant. Most notable is the strong significance of the confidence indicator throughout 
period 1 to 4. German GDP is only significant in time period 4. In the test containing data pre-
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1995, Germany was still divided7. This might be a reason for why it is not significant in the 
other tests that includes an adequate amount of observations. TCW is significant in time 
period 2, suggesting that the exchange rate to some extent has an impact on the level of 
aggregate real corporate investment.  
 
The strong significance of the confidence indicator effectively means that current demand and 
expectations about future demand for Swedish corporations play a crucial role in the level of 
aggregate corporate investment. Expectations are incorporated in the Tobin’s Q model of 
investment which may therefore be a good estimator of aggregate corporate investment with 
regard to our results. If we consider the neoclassical investment theory we propose that 
expectations of future demand should be included in the model such as; 
 
𝐾∗ =  
𝛼(𝑌 +  𝑌𝑒)
𝐶𝑘
𝜎         (4) 
    
Where Ye is a new variable accounting for expected demand. One could argue that 
expectations is already incorporated in the user cost of capital as expectations of future 
economic activity affect the real interest rate through the Fisher equation. However, as our 
results show that the interest rate does not affect investment we believe that the introduction 
of an independent output expectation variable is valid. Such model could potentially explain 
the effects of monetary policy on aggregate investment more accurate considering our results. 
Nevertheless, the feasibility of such model is subject for further research.   
 
Profits should theoretically be an important determinant of corporate investment as 
corporations have access to more cheap internal funding when profits increase as proposed by 
Mayers & Majluf (1984). However, we find no proof of this relationship as profits are not 
significant in any of the time periods. On the other hand, the level of investment made in t-1 
and t-2 is highly significant trough out period 1-4. Logically, if corporations invest in t-1 or   
t-2, they may not have the need to invest in period t.  
Even though there is a clear tendency towards investment being driven mainly by demand and 
expectations, the Swedish output is not significant in any of the time periods and to some 
                                                          
7 The east part before the fall of the Berlin wall is considered a closed economy and therefore the constructed 
GDP-measure might not be an adequate measurement for export levels pre 1990. 
19 
 
extent conflicting with the hypothesis. If Swedish demand increases, corporations should 
invest in order to meet the new demand.  
 
Conclusion  
In this study we have investigated if the short term nominal interest rate has a direct 
significant impact on corporate investment as suggested by the channels of the monetary 
transmission mechanism used in the theoretical framework of the Swedish Riksbank. We find 
that the interest rate does not have an effect on aggregate corporate investment in our model8, 
hence cost of capital seems of less importance for the level of aggregate corporate investment. 
A possible explanation for this may be that we often face low interest rates in times when 
demand is low, and high interest rates in times when demand is high - effectively nullifying 
much of the interest rate effect given by the theories discussed in this paper. 
 
On the other hand, we find GDP-growth for big export partners as well as the confidence 
indicator being of importance for corporate investment, effectively meaning that current 
demand and future demand expectations play a great role in the determination of aggregate 
corporate investment and strongly indicate corporate investment being driven by demand and 
expectations. We propose that expected demand should be included in the neoclassical 
investment model in order to account for the significant effects of demand expectations.  
 
According to our results, the common belief among policy makers that lower interest rates 
increases capital expenditures is incorrect. Therefore there is a need for policy makers to 
reconsider the importance of interest rates as a mean to increase aggregate corporate 
investment. 
 
 
 
. 
 
                                                          
8 One should keep in mind that the interest rates may affect other factors, such as aggregate demand, which in 
turn will have a second order effect on aggregate investment. The exact relationship is however subject for 
further research.  
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Appendix 
Test for Autocorrelation 
When conducting studies involving time series data it is important to check the residuals for 
autocorrelation, this has been done for the regressions using the Breusch-Godfrey serial 
correlation test with LeGrange Multiplier as suggested by Godfrey (Godfrey, 1978). The more 
commonly used Durbin Watson test9 is invalid when we have a dynamic regression model 
with lagged dependent variables as estimators (Breusch, 1978). The test is conducted under 
the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation and a chi-square statistic. The statistics we receive 
from the Breusch-Godfrey test are shown in Table 4; As we can see, our tests show no proof, 
with the exception of the period 1995-2014, of being auto correlated at the 5% level. We have 
therefore adjusted the standard errors in that regression using the matrix proposed by Newey 
& West (1987). 
Period 1987-2014 1987-2008 1995-2008 1995-2014 2009-2014 
F-stat 1.607092 2.086511 1.132652 3.265253 1.052995 
Prob.F 0.2058 0.1317 0.3316 0.0443 0.3816 
Obs*R-square 3.498812 4.607514 2.752478 7.009754 3.695849 
Prob. χ-square 0.1739 0.0999* 0.2525 0.0301** 0.1576 
 Table 3: **, * represents significance at 5 and 10% level respectively 
As we can see, our tests show no proof, with the exception of the period 1995-2014, of being 
auto correlated at the 5% level. We have therefore adjusted the standard errors in that test 
using the matrix proposed by Newey & West (1987). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 For more information see (Durbin & Watson, 1950) 
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Test for Heteroskedasticity 
A test for heteroskedasticity is conducted to make sure the parameter estimates are efficient 
and that the covariance matrix estimates are consistent. The more generic test proposed by 
Halbert White (White, 1980) is used to check the residuals for non-consistent variance over 
the time series. The null hypothesis of homoscedasticity cannot be rejected in our tests, apart 
from the time period 1987-2014 and 1987-2008, therefore we choose to reject the alternative 
hypothesis of heteroskedasticity in all but those two tests10. We have chosen not to include the 
cross-terms of the regressors, and therefore limiting the test to a pure heteroskedasticity test.  
Period 1987-2014 1987-2008 1995-2008 1995-2014 2009-2014 
F-stat 5.622829 3.210819 0.786175 1.329740 1.853491 
Prob.F 0.0000 0.0025 0.6302 0.2376 0.1511 
Obs*R-square 36.77785 23.53821 7.472919 11.68037 12.92636 
Prob. χ-square 0.0000*** 0.0051*** 0.5880 0.2319 0.1660 
Table 4: *** significant at 1%. 
 
                                                          
10 Therefore the standard errors has been adjusted for heteroskedasticity using White (1980) standard errors in 
those two tests. 
